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Abstract
This paper discusses the effect of income inequality on selection and aggregate
productivity in a general equilibrium model with non-homothetic preferences. It
shows the existence of a negative relationship between the number and quantity of
products consumed by an income group and the earnings of other income groups.
It also highlights the negative effect of a mean-preserving spread of income on ag-
gregate productivity through the softening of firms’ selection. This effect is however
mitigated in the presence of international trade. In a quantitative analysis, it is shown
that an excessively large mean-preserving spread of income may harm the rich as it
raises firms’ markups on their purchases. This is contrary to the general belief that
income inequality benefits the rich.
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1 Introduction
Income inequality has reappeared as a hot social and economic issue in many developed
countries (Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2011, Piketty 2013). The majority of the economics
literature has focused on studying the causes for income inequality, and technological
progress and trade liberalization have been presented as two major driving forces.1 In
this paper, we ask a different question – how does income inequality affect aggregate
economic performance and welfare in the context of an open economy? In particular, does
there exist an equity-efficiency trade-off in the sense that an increase in income inequality
(i.e., a decrease in equity) increases efficiency as measured by aggregate productivity? Or,
could this be the other way around?
These questions have largely been ignored in the trade literature because of the usual
premise of homothetic preferences or absence of income effects in the consumption of
traded goods (e.g. Krugman 1981, Melitz 2003,2 Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). As these
premises make most aggregate economic variables invariant to income redistribution
there is no point to discuss their effect here. In contrast, the assumption of non-homothetic
preferences can shed light on the effect of income inequality on aggregate productivity
and welfare in the frameworks of the recent trade literature with firm heterogeneity and
endogenous product variety à la Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
We first motivate our theoretical investigation by examining the conditional corre-
lations between a country’s TFP and its income inequality. Using country-year panel
data covering 1996-2012, and using the Gini coefficient and top 10% income share as two
measures of income inequality, we find significant and negative correlations of aggregate
TFP with the two inequality measures, controlling for country and/or year fixed effects.
Moreover, as the two major explanations for the cross-country differences in economic
performance are institutions and geography (or market access), we also control for these
two factors, and find that the negative correlation remains robust. In other words, even
conditional on institution, geography, and history (the state of development of a country
immediately preceding 1996 is subsumed into the country fixed-effect), income inequality
provides additional explanatory power on the aggregate TFP of a country.
We propose a theoretical analysis in which income inequality and trade affect aggre-
gate productivity. We study a general equilibrium model in which firms have hetero-
1For skill-biased technical change, see, for example, Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998) and Acemoglu
(2002). On the effect of globalization, see, for example, Behrens, Pokrovsky and Zhelobodko (2014), Costinot
and Vogel (2010), Fieler (2011), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding
(2010), Grossman and Helpman (2015), and Grossman, Helpman, and Kircher (forthcoming).
2In fact, this conclusion applies for all models in the model class characterized by Arkolakis, Costinot,
and Rodriguez-Clare (2012).
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geneous productivity and individuals are endowed with different skills and the same
Stone-Geary non-homothetic preferences.3 The presence of various skill groups results in
income inequality and leads to demand patterns varying with individual incomes. We
concentrate on an economy with two income groups (rich and poor) not only for the sake
of analytical tractability but also because of the recent focus on top and bottom income
groups. For tractability, we impose a Pareto productivity distribution in some parts of the
analysis.
To clarify the basic properties of the model, we first analyze a closed economy where
each firm enters and designs a differentiated variety and then decides to exit or produce
its variety according to an idiosyncratic unit production cost. Under the assumed pref-
erences, the consumption choice of an individual is unambiguously represented by the
choke price of her inverse demand function. This corresponds to the maximum price at
which she is willing to purchase a first unit of a variety. In contrast to Melitz and Otta-
viano (2008) where there is no income effect due to quasi-linear preference, choke prices
in our model differ across income groups. The choke prices of the rich and poor groups
are then sufficient statistics of the demands for the whole set of varieties in the economy.
Moreover, the price elasticity of individual demand also varies with choke price. In par-
ticular, ceteris paribus, the richer income group faces lower price elasticity of demand.
For this reason, firms’ pricing behavior hinges upon income groups and firms separate in
two sets: those firms that have low unit production cost and target all consumers with low
prices and those firms that have high unit production cost and target only rich consumers
with high prices. This is readily illustrated by the example of posters and art paintings:
while both goods have the same decorative functionality, the latter is much more costly to
make (especially in terms of per unit quality). At the equilibrium, only richer individuals
are willing to purchase the two goods to decorate their houses. At the equilibrium, the
price of each variety follows the movement of the rich and poor’s choke prices.
Income inequality affects the average productivity across firms. It indeed alters the
prices of varieties through its effect on the rich and poor’s equilibrium choke prices. We
show that an increase in the rich group’s income raises this group’s choke price, but there
is a cross effect in which this increase in the rich’s income reduces the poor’s choke price.
The rich are willing to consume a wider set of varieties and entice new firms producing
more costly varieties to enter. At the same time prices augment and the poor reduce the
basket and the quantity of their purchases. On average, firms use more input to produce
their goods, which decreases the average productivity. A similar effect emerges when
the poor become poorer because the cross effect implies that the rich’s choke price be-
3The same preference is also used by Simonovska (2015).
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comes larger. As a result, a mean-preserving spread implies a lower average productivity
because the rich’s choke price unambiguously increases, and there are on average more
costly firms in the economy.
We secondly study the effect of trade liberalization in an open economy. We find that
the negative effect of a mean-preserving spread on aggregate productivity is mitigated
by trade liberalization. The intuition is that lower trade costs expand variety and induce
tougher selection. Smaller trade costs lead to a tougher selection of firms in favor of those
with lower production costs. Compared with autarky, the number of unsold varieties is
larger within the global economy. Hence, when the rich get a higher income, they spread
their consumption towards the wider set of unsold goods in the whole world rather than
concentrating their purchases on the narrower set of domestic unsold goods. In the end,
consumed goods are produced with lower costs. In other words, it is the productivity
gains of globalization that mitigate the negative impact of income inequality on average
productivity.
We conduct a quantitative analysis to further examine the properties that are difficult
to obtain analytically. The above-mentioned analysis regarding average productivity is
based on the unweighted average across firms. We examine how aggregate productiv-
ity (i.e., average productivity weighted by cost) reacts to mean-preserving spreads. In
particular, when the poor become poorer, their consumption basket tends more toward
the varieties that are cheaper to produce. Can this force alter the previous result? The
answer is no: we still find unambiguous decreases in aggregate productivity with mean-
preserving spreads.
In the quantitative analysis, we set the rich group to be the top 10% income earners. In
2014, the income ratio between the two groups in the US was 7:9. Using equivalent vari-
ation as a “real” measure of utility change, we find that an income reallocation from the
income ratio of 7:9 to 1 is equivalent to a 69% rise of the poor’s real income and a 30% fall
of the rich’s. However, this result suggests that for a given amount of additional income,
the improvement in welfare in real terms would be larger if such additional income were
given to the poor than to the rich. Similarly, even assuming Benthamite social welfare
function, in which case the social planner does not actually value equality in utility, our
result shows that income reallocation from the rich to the poor is welfare-improving.
Surprisingly, we also find that whereas mean-preserving spreads increase the rich’s
income, the effect on the rich’s utility can actually fall when the income inequality is
large. The reason behind this result is two-fold: increasing income inequality reduces
aggregate productivity and increases markups when the rich/poor gain/lose presence in
the market. On the gains from trade, we find that moving from autarky to a benchmark
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trade cost ( = 1:7) is equivalent to increases of the poor’s and rich’s real incomes by 8:9%
and 3:6%, respectively. Trade liberalization therefore benefits more the poor because the
poor consume more heavily on traded goods.4
Our paper is closely related to the broad literature of heterogeneous firms and pro-
ductivity that is pioneered by Melitz (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Bernard,
Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003). To our knowledge, our analysis is the first to offer
new testable predictions about how income inequality affects firm selection and average
productivity. In contrast to the traditional view of the equity-efficiency tradeoff, Aghion
et al. (1999) have highlighted that reducing income inequality may promote economic
growth through saving, investment and incentives. Matsuyama (2002) has studied the
dynamic effect of income inequality on productivity in the context of homogeneous firms
and learning by doing. Higher income inequality is detrimental to growth because it
reduces the “mass of consumption” and therefore the dynamic productivity gains from
learning by doing. Through a different mechanism, our model shows that average pro-
ductivity falls with inequality as it shuffles the mass of consumption from low-cost to
high-cost goods.
The paper relates to the literature on the relationship between income heterogene-
ity and trade. Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991), Matsuyama (2000), Fajgelbaum,
Grossman and Helpman (2011) and Matsuyama (2015) are important contributions. These
studies, however, focus on the effect of income heterogeneity on the patterns of trade and
product cycle in contexts in which goods differ in some vertical attributes (quality, prior-
ity of consumption, or income elasticity). These contributions do not discuss the effect on
selection and productivity.
This paper is also related to the broad literature on the effect of nonhomothetic pref-
erence. It can be used to study pro-competitive effect and pricing to markets, such as in
Simonovska (2015) and Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodriguez-Clare (2017), or
on structural change, such as in Comin, Lashkari, and M. Mestieri (2015). Even though
there are income effects in these models, there is no differentiation of income within a
country.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an empirical
motivation for our theoretical investigation. Section 3 lays out the model in the closed
economy, and provides various comparative statics, with a focus on the effect of income.
Section 4 extends the model to the open economy, and carries out similar analysis with a
focus on the effect of trade liberalization. Section 5 provides a quantitative analysis of the
effects on aggregate productivity and welfare. Section 6 concludes.
4A similar point was made by Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016)
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2 Empirical Motivation
To motivate our theory, this section provides suggestive evidence on the relationship be-
tween income inequality and productivity. This section presents essentially conditional
correlations without attempting to establish a causal relation. As we are concerned with
how productivity is related to income inequality, we control for two major factors affect-
ing the level of development or technology of a country – institution and geography (i.e.,
market access).5 Mainly, we ask the following question: conditional on institution and
market access, is there a positive or negative correlation between income inequality and
country-level productivity? We first describe our country-year panel data and empirical
specification, and then present the results.
Country-level productivity is measured by the total factor productivity (TFP) obtained
from the Penn World Table (PWT) 9.0.6 A special feature of the PWT data is that there is
one measure of TFP for cross-country comparison (CTFP), where the TFP level of the USA
is set to 1 for all years, and another by-country time-series measure (RTFPNA), where the
TFP level is calculated relative to the country’s 2011 level (hence the TFP of each country
at 2011 is set to 1). To utilize the panel data nature of our regressors, we construct a panel
of TFPs in the following way. We calculate a country c’s TFP at year t relative to the US’
level at 2011:
TFPc;t  CTFPc;t  RTFPNAUSA;t.
A concern of such a panel of TFPs is that if year fixed-effects are controlled, then the panel
is essentially reduced to a pool of cross-section TFPs because RTFPNAUSA;t is the same for
all countries for each given year; thus, in this case, we basically rely on the cross-sectional
variations of the regressors to explain the variation in the TFP. We include specifications
where (1) only country fixed-effects are controlled and (2) both country and year fixed-
effects are controlled.
We use two measures for income inequality for the period of 1996-2012: the Gini Co-
efficient and the share of total income by the top 10 percent (Top 10% Income Share), both
obtained from World Development Indicator.7 Following the literature on institution,
5There is a vast literature regarding these two factors. On the role of institution, see, for examples,
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), Levchenko (2007), and Acemoglu and Anderson (2012). On the
role of geography and market access, see, for examples, Krugman (1991), Diamond (1997), Redding and
Venables (2004), Redding and Sturm (2008).
6For the detailed account on Penn World Table 8.0 and 9.0, see Feesntra, Inklaar, Timmer (2015).
7We interpolate (but not extrapolate) the missing values based on available years for each country. The
number of countries in the overlap between the income-inequality measure and the TFP varies year by year,
but the number of countries is significantly smaller than 66 before 1996 and after 2012. Hence, we restrict
the sample to 1996-2012 for a more inclusive set of countries.
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we use the rule of law as the measure for institutional quality of a country. The Rule of
Law index is obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank.8
Following the literature on economic geography, we define Market Access as a trade-cost-
discounted and price-deflated sum of market sizes around the world. We use the real
market potential from CEPII’s Market Potential database.9
We first peek at the simple correlation by plotting averages of log of TFP and averages
of income inequality measures (the averages are taken over years). Panels (A) and (B) of
Figure 1 plot the average Gini Coefficient and average Top 10% Income Share, respectively.
There is a clear negative correlation between income inequality and TFP.
Figure 1(A) Figure 1(B)
We will estimate the following equation:
ln TFPit = 0 + 1Inequalityit + 2Xit + di + dt + "it
where Inequalityit is the measure of inequality for country i in year t; Xit denotes our set
of covariates (Rule of Law and log of Market Access); di and dt are country and year fixed
effects. Note that the country fixed-effect includes history, i.e., the state of development
of a country immediately preceding 1996. To account for potential serial correlations and
heteroscedasticity, standard errors are clustered at the country level.
8This index is calculated by including several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, including perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effec-
tiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. During 1996-2012, the Rule of
Law is missing in 1997, 1999, and 2001, and hence we also interpolate for the missing values for these years.
9This is computed using Head and Mayer’s (2004) method, which adjusts for the impact of national
borders on trade flows.
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The regression results are reported in Table 1. Columns (1) - (6) show results based
on the Gini coefficient, whereas Columns (7) - (12) use the top 10% income shares. For
each income inequality measure, the first column estimates the case where both year and
country fixed-effects are controlled, whereas the second one estimates the case where
the year fixed-effects are dropped for the reason explained above. The third and fourth
columns are similar to the first two, except that now the Rule of Law is included as a
control variable. The sample includes 1297 observations with 100 countries.10 In the fifth
and sixth columns, we further include Market Access as a control. One caveat is that the
sample size is reduced by half when Market Access is included because the available years
for this measure range only to 2003.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Both measures of inequality exhibit significant and negative correlation with TFP
across most columns, consistent with the observation from Figure 1. When we control
for institution and geography, the coefficients on income inequality in Columns (5-6) and
(11-12) are significant at the 10% level, whereas those in the other columns are significant
at the 1% level. This difference in significance levels is mostly due to the smaller sample
sizes in Columns (5-6) and (11-12) due to data constraints. Also, the TFP of a country is
higher when the country has a larger effective market size and better institution, confirm-
ing the rationales of including these controls.
Columns (6) and (12) are our most preferred specification, as it allows both the time-
varying and cross-sectional variations of the regressors to explain the variation in TFP.
Taking Column (12) as a benchmark, we can interpret the coefficient of  0:807 as the
following: if the Top 10% Income Share increases by 10 percentage points, the associated
decline in TFP is about 7:7%, conditional on the same rule of law, market access, and year
fixed-effects and country-specific time-invariant factors.
We next turn to our theory of how average productivity is affected by income inequal-
ity. We note here that our explanation is based on productivity selection, a mechanism
that is distinct from institution or geography.
3 Closed Economy
We present a model where a mass N of individuals are endowed with Stone-Geary pref-
erences over a set of differentiated varieties ! 2 
. Each individual h belongs to either
10Nevertheless, due to data constraints, it is an unbalanced panel.
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the high or low income group h 2 fL;Hg with income sh > 0 and probability h 2 (0; 1);
h 2 fL;Hg (sH > sL and H + L = 1). Each firm produces a distinct variety !. Firms
differ in marginal cost c(!) and face monopolistic competition.
3.1 Demand
An individual in the income group h chooses the consumption profile q (:) that maximizes
her utility
R
!2
 ln (1 + q (!) =q) d!
11 subject to her budget constraint
R
!2
 p (!) q (!) d! =
sh, where q > 0 is a constant and the price profile p () is taken as given.12 Without loss of
generality we can normalize the unit of goods such that q = 1. Her demand is equal to
qh (!) =
p^h
p (!)
  1; (1)
where
p^h =
sh + Ph
j
hj ; (2)
and 
h is the set of goods that she consumes, j
hj 
R
!2
h d! is the measure of this set
and
Ph 
Z
!2
h
p (!) d! (3)
is her (personal) price index over her consumptions (see Appendix A). The choke price
p^h is the intercept of the individual demand curve; that is, the willingness to pay for the
first unit of a good. At given exogenous set of prices and consumed goods, the choke
price increases with larger income and aggregate price index and with a smaller set of
consumed goods. Yet, for any endogenous set of consumed goods, it is readily shown
that the choke price is larger for higher income individuals: p^H > p^L.
The aggregate demand for each good ! with price p(!) = p is given by
Q (p) 
8<: HN

p^H
p
  1

if p 2 [p^L; p^H)
N

p^HL
p
  1

if p 2 [0; p^L)
; (4)
where p^HL  H p^H+Lp^L is the average of individual choke prices (p^H  p^HL  p^L). For a
11This is an affine transformation of the original Stone-Geary utility function
R
!2
 ln (q (!) + q) d!.
12We use an additive utility function that yields the Stone-Geary demand functions. These are linear in
income but do not exhibit expenditure proportionality (Pollak 1971). The linearity property is essential for
the demand aggregation process below. The utility function belongs to the class of hierarchical preferences
whereby the rich’s basket of goods includes the poor’s one, which has recieved good empirical support
(Jackson 1984). Simonovska (2015) exploits this set-up to study international pricing-to-market under the
assumption of homogenous income within a country.
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given price p, the aggregate demand Q (p) is the same for all varieties because of the sym-
metric preferences. Because of the presence of two income groups, it has a convex kink
at p = p^L. This model mixes the properties of Mussa and Rosen’s (1978) unit-purchase
model with two income groups of consumers who demand one unit of an indivisible
good with continuous-purchase models where goods are infinitely divisible.
The price elasticity is
"(p) =  d lnQ (p)
d ln p
=
(
p^H
p^H p if p 2 [p^L; p^H)
p^HL
p^HL p if p 2 [0; p^L)
:
Because p^H  p^HL, for a same price p, the elasticity is lower in the rich consumer segment.
3.2 Production
Labor is the only input. We consider two groups of individuals who differ only in the
number of efficiency units they offer: a high (low) income individual is endowed with
sH (sL) efficiency units of labor. In other words, we can interpret this as a difference in
human capital. We choose the labor efficiency unit as the numéraire so that sH and sL also
measure high and low incomes.
Each firm produces and sells a unique variety ! under monopolistic competition. We
assume the existence of a large pool of potential risk neutral entrants. By hiring f units of
labor, each entrant obtains a distinct variety ! and gets a feasible production defined by
an idiosyncratic marginal input in labor efficiency units, c 2 R+. Given the above choice
of numéraire, this also denotes the firm’s marginal cost. The parameter c is drawn from
a cumulative probability distribution G : R+ ! [0; 1]. We denote the mass of entrants by
M . Therefore, each measure of goods d! is identical to the measure MdG(c).
Each firm maximizes its profit  (c) = (p  c)Q (p) taking the choke prices p^L and p^H
as given. Because the demand Q (p) includes two segments, a firm can choose between
targeting only the high income group or both income groups. A firm’s optimal markup
is readily given by
m(p)  p(c)
c
=
"(p)
"(p)  1 =
(
p^H
p
if p 2 [p^L; p^H)
p^HL
p
if p 2 [0; p^L)
:
Because p^HL  p^H , for a same price, markup is higher in the rich’s market segment. The
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optimal price is given by
p (c) =
(
(p^HLc)
1=2 if c  c^
(p^Hc)
1=2 if c > c^
(5)
and
c^1=2  (p^HL)
1=2   (H p^H)1=2
1  1=2H
: (6)
(see Appendix B). Except at c = c^, the optimal price is a strictly concave increasing func-
tion of c. The concavity reflects the presence of a pro-competitive effect whereby markups
fall with higher cost c. Observe that because p^H > p^HL, the price jumps upward for the
firm with cost c just above c^; reflecting a switch towards targeting the high income con-
sumers. Note that in a partial equilibrium where we change one choke price and take the
other as fixed, we have
@c^
@p^H
< 0 and
@c^
@p^L
> 0: (7)
This means that the cutoff c^ falls when the rich have a higher income and their choke
prices rise. This is because their willingness to pay improves and more firms find it prof-
itable to target them. By contrast, the cutoff rises when the poor become richer and their
choke price rises. Targeting the entire population becomes more profitable.
In the product market equilibrium, each income group purchases the goods that are
targeted to them. In particular, the low income consumers buy only the goods produced
at cost in the range [0; c^]. This means that their choke price p^L satisfies p (c^  0) < p^L <
p (c^+ 0). Given that all these goods are actually supplied by firms it must also be that
they have low enough costs, i.e. c^ < p^L. High income individuals purchase goods pro-
duced at costs in a range [0; c^H ] with c^H > c^. At the equilibrium, the price of the last
purchased good is lower than their choke price: p (c^H)  p^H . Furthermore this good is
supplied by a firm that makes zero profit. This implies that p^H = p (c^H) = c^H . In Ap-
pendix B, we show that those conditions always hold. We summarize those points in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium price p (c) increases in marginal cost c and jumps up in c at
c^. Low income consumers purchase goods produced at cost c 2 [0; c^] and high income consumers
those at cost c 2 [0; p^H ], where p^H > c^.
It is worth pointing out that the quantity q (!) in the utility function can actually be
interpreted as quality units if unit production cost c is also in terms of the cost per unit
of quality. Namely, the fact that the rich purchase more costly goods in this model can
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be understood as their purchasing goods with higher costs per unit of quality. Thus, our
model is entirely consistent with the notion that the rich purchase high quality goods. In
our model, the rich’s willingness to pay for quality is, indeed, larger than the poor’s.
3.3 Equilibrium
Given Proposition 1, at the product market equilibrium, the choke prices can be written
as
p^L =
sL + PL
MG (c^)
; p^H =
sH + PH
MG (p^H)
and p^HL = H p^H + Lp^L
and the price indices as
PL = (p^HL)
1=2
Z c^
0
c1=2MdG (c) and PH = PL + p^
1=2
H
Z p^H
c^
c1=2MdG (c) :
Eliminating price indices, these equilibrium conditions can be expressed as
eH (p^H ; p^L)  sH
M
= 0 (8)
eL (p^H ; p^L)  sL
M
= 0; (9)
where
eH (p^H ; p^L) =
Z c^
0

p^H   (H p^H + Lp^L)1=2 c1=2

dG (c) +
Z p^H
c^

p^H   p^1=2H c1=2

dG (c) ;
eL (p^H ; p^L) =
Z c^
0

p^L   (H p^H + Lp^L)1=2 c1=2

dG (c)
are the consumers’ average expenditures per available variety while c^ is given by its defin-
ition (6). After some algebraic manipulations, one can simplify the equilibrium conditions
(8) and (9) as
M =
sH
eH (p^H ; p^L)
=
sL
eL (p^H ; p^L)
: (10)
Thus, consumer expenditures per unit of income are equal across income groups and
equal to the equilibrium mass of entrants . The product market equilibrium is defined by
the solution of those two equations for the choke prices (p^H ; p^L). For a given M , the equi-
librium choke prices are sufficient statistics of product market equilibrium consumption
and production choices.
In the long run firms enter the market. Before entry, each entrant expects to cover her
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entry cost so that Z 1
0
maxf (c) ; 0gdG (c) = f;
where the profit  (c) is given by N

p^
1=2
HL   c1=2
2
if c  c^ and by HN

p^
1=2
H   c1=2
2
if
c > c^. Then, the entry condition is expressed as
 (p^H ; p^L) =
f
N
; (11)
where
 (p^H ; p^L) =
Z p^H
0
max

(H p^H + Lp^L)
1=2   c1=2
2
, H

p^
1=2
H   c1=2
2
dG (c) (12)
is the expected operational profit after entry. The general equilibrium is defined by the
variables p^H ; p^L and M solving the equations in (8), (9) and (11). Finally, let the marginal
cost distribution have a bounded support and finite mean:
G : [0; cM ]! [0; 1] such that E(c) =
Z cM
0
cdG (c) <1: (A0)
We prove the existence of a fixed point to the system of equations (8), (9) and (11):
Proposition 2. There exists an equilibrium under (A0).
Proof. See Appendix C.
A condition for the uniqueness of the general equilibrium can be found as follows.
First note that the expected operational profit  (p^H ; p^L) is an increasing function of both
choke prices. So, the entry condition describes a decreasing relationship between the two
choke prices. Second, it can be seen that the second equality in (10) describes an increasing
relationship between the two choke prices if the conditions @eh=@p^h > 0 and @eh=@p^l < 0
hold for any h 6= l 2 fH;Lg: Under these conditions, it is clear that the two relationships
cross in a single point (p^H ; p^L) that yields the unique equilibrium. The main question is
to verify that these conditions are true.
Using (6), it is easy to verify that the poor’s expenditure increases with their own
choke price and falls with the rich’s choke price: @eL=@p^L > 0 and @eL=@p^H < 0. The
symmetric condition holds for the rich provided that firms do not change consumer
segment targets, that is, if the cut-off cost c^ is fixed. However, by (6), the cut-off cost
c^ falls (dc^ < 0) when p^H rises or p^L falls. Then a mass  g(c^)dc^ > 0 of firms shift to
target the high income segment, which reduces the rich’s expenditure by the amount
p^
1=2
H   (H p^H + Lp^L)1=2

c^1=2 ( g(c^)dc^). The change in the firms’ segment target there-
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fore decreases the rich’s expenditure and goes in the opposite direction of the effect of
choke prices when c^ is fixed. Since this countervailing effect is proportional to the density
g(c^), a smoothness property is required to guarantee that G is not misbehaved about c =
c^. Let
@eH=@p^H > 0 and @eH=@p^L < 0: (A1)
We then have the following:
Proposition 3. The equilibrium exists and is unique if the cost distribution G satisfies (A0) and
(A1).
3.4 Income Distribution
We are interested in understanding how demands and choke prices are affected by changes
in the income levels of the two groups. Intuitively, an increase in the income of one group
raises its willingness to pay, choke price and product demands. Since demand elasticity
falls with higher income, markups and prices increase. Facing higher prices, the other
group is enticed to diminish its consumption, which should be reflected by lower choke
prices. In Appendix D, we prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Under (A0) and (A1), a rise in the rich (resp. poor) group’s skill and income raises its
choke price and demands whereas it reduces the poor’s (resp. rich’s). Formally,
d ln p^h
d ln sh
=  d ln p^h
d ln sl
> 0; h 2 fH;Lg; ` 6= h: (13)
This yields implications about the effect of income distribution on the average pro-
ductivity and set of consumption goods. First, in this model, the two group incomes can
be written as sH = s+ Lv and sL = s  Hv where
s  LsL + HsH (14)
v  sH   sL (15)
are the average income and the income differential, respectively. Using this definition, a
mean-preserving spread of the income distribution is equivalent to a rise in v, holding s,
H and L constant. As a result, by (13), a mean-preserving spread increases the choke
price of the high income group. It indeed increases the high income and decreases the
low income so that
d ln p^H
dv
=
d ln p^H
d ln sH
d ln sH
dv
+
d ln p^H
d ln sL
d ln sL
dv
=
s
sHsL
d ln p^H
d ln sH
> 0: (16)
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Second, the average productivity is negatively related to the (unweighted) average
cost in the economy, which is given by
R p^H
0
cdG (c) =
R p^H
0
dG (c). The average cost moves
in the same direction as the choke price p^H while the average productivity goes in the
opposite direction. Hence, by (13), the average productivity falls with higher sH . By (16),
it also falls with a mean-preserving spread of the income distribution (higher v). The
point is that when the high income group gets richer, it consumes more varieties with
high production cost, which raises the average cost and reduces the average productivity
in the economy.
Finally, we investigate how the baskets of goods is altered after income changes. The
basket of the poor is given by the cut-off cost c^. This cost falls with a higher income for
the rich and decreases with a higher income for the poor. We indeed have
d lnc^
d lnsH
=
@ ln c^
@ ln p^H
d lnp^H
d lnsH
+
@ ln c^
@ ln p^L
d lnp^L
d lnsH
< 0;
where the inequality stems from (7) and (13). The increase in the rich’s income raises their
demand so that more firms target them and raise their prices. Higher prices then decrease
the poor’s demand and raise further the incentives to target the rich. It is readily verified
that the opposite effect holds with a change in the poor’s income: d lnc^=d lnsL > 0. As
a consequence, a mean-preserving spread of the income distribution reduces the cut-off
cost c^. Indeed one readily checks that
d lnc^
dv
=
d lnc^
d lnsH
d lnsH
dv
+
d lnc^
d lnsL
d lnsL
dv
< 0:
The mean-preserving spread therefore reduces the relative measure of varieties consumed
by the poor to the rich: that is, it reduces the ratio
MG (c^)
MG (p^H)
=
G (c^)
G (p^H)
:
Proposition 4. Suppose that the cost distribution G satisfies (A0) and (A1). Then, a mean-
preserving spread of the income distribution (i) increases the choke price of the high income group,
(ii) reduces the (unweighted) average productivity in the economy and (iii) reduces the set of goods
consumed by the poor relative to that by the rich.
Income redistribution policies have the opposite effect of mean-preserving spreads:
they lower the choke price of the high income group and raise average productivity. This
model yields a clear-cut answer as to how a mean-preserving spread of income distribu-
tions affects aggregate economic performances. Such a result does not appear in a model
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under homothetic preference or under a quasi-linear preference (Melitz 2003; Melitz and
Ottaviano, 2008).13
3.5 Pareto Productivity Distribution
To obtain more analytical results, we now assume a Pareto productivity distribution.
Since c is the inverse of productivity, this implies that the c.d.f. of the cost distribution
is given by G (c) = (c=cM)
 for c 2 [0; cM ] and   1. For the sake of conciseness, we fur-
ther use r = p^H=p^L to refer to the choke price ratio. The equilibrium prices are expressed
as
p (c) =
(
(Hr + L)
1=2 p^
1=2
L c
1=2 if c  c^
r1=2p^
1=2
L c
1=2 if c > c^
; (17)
while the cutoff cost is
c^1=2 =
(Hr + L)
1=2   1=2H r1=2
1  1=2H
p^
1=2
L : (18)
This gives the following three equilibrium conditions
0 = 

r;; H ;
sH
sL

(19)
p^L = c

+1
M

f
N
 1
+1
[ 2 (r;; H)]
  1
+1 (20)
M =
NsL
f
 2 (r;; H)
 1 (r;; H)
: (21)
where ,  1 and  2 are functions given in Appendix E. From (19) the value of the choke
price ratio r depends only on the exogenous parameters ; H , and the income ratio
sH=sL. Given the value of r, one can determine the choke price p^L and the mass of en-
trants M from (20) and (21). The Pareto cost distribution permits the separation of the
effects of some parameters and sufficient statistics such as sH=sL and f=N . In terms of
the effect of the income distribution, we show in Appendix E that r strictly increases in
sH=sL. In Appendix E, we show that using this fact and Lemma 1,  2 and  2= 1 are both
strictly increasing in r. From these, it is shown that (13) holds. We have the following
proposition.
13For example, in Melitz (2003), the homothetic preference implies that all that matters for selection is the
mean (or total) income. In Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the quasi-linear preference also implies the income
elasticity of demand for differentiated goods is zero. That is, richer individuals spend the same amount on
the differentiated products as the poor individuals, and they only spend more in the numéraire good.
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Proposition 5. Suppose a Pareto productivity distribution. Then,
1. There exists a unique equilibrium.
2. Assumptions (A0) and (A1) hold so that Proposition 4 holds.
3. The equilibrium choke price ratio r strictly increases with income inequality (higher sH=sL).
4. The number of entrants M is proportional to the population size N and inversely propor-
tional to entry cost f .
5. The choke prices (p^L; p^H), the cut-off cost c^, and the equilibrium price p (c) of any firm
with cost c increase in the maximum cost cM and the entry cost f , and decrease with the
population size N .
6. A proportional increase in incomes (i.e. higher sL holding sH=sL unchanged) raises the mass
of entrants M proportional to the average income.
Proof. We show in Appendix E that (A0) and (A1) are satisfied by G (c) = (c=cM)
 for
c 2 [0; cM ] and   1. Thus, by Lemma 1 and Propositions 3 and 4, Points 1 and 2 hold.
For Point 3, also see Appendix E. Points 4-6 can be obtained by observing (19) and (21).
Under a Pareto productivity distribution, the equilibrium utility can be written as
U (sH) =
Mp^L
cM

a ln

r1=2 (Hr + L)
 1=2

+
r
2

(22)
U (sL) =
Mp^L
cM

a
2
  a ln
h
1  1=2H

a+ (Har)
1=2
i
(23)
where a  c^=p^L =
h
(Hr + L)
1=2   1=2H r1=2
i2
=

1  1=2H
2
with 1=r < a < 1 < r. Using
the equilibrium conditions, we have
Mp^L
cM
= sL

N
f
 1
+1
c
  
+1
M
[ 2 (r;; H)]
1
+1
 1 (r;; H)
.
So, utility rises with the larger population mass N and lower fixed input f . Those para-
meters indeed increase labor supply and decrease labor demand so that more firms enter
and generate more product diversity and more competition, which benefit consumers.
Larger average productivity also raises utility as it can be easily shown that a decrease
in cM increases both the intensive and extensive margins. The utility differential between
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high and low income consumers is equal to
U (sH)  U (sL) = Mp^

L
2cM

a ln

r (Hr + L)
 1
h
1  1=2H

a+ (Har)
1=2
i2
+
r   a


=
Mp^L
2cM
8><>:a ln
264ar
h
1  1=2H

a1=2 + (Hr)
1=2
i2
Hr + L
375+ r   a

9>=>; :
As ar > 1, it can be easily shown that the logarithm term is positive. Hence, U (sH) >
U (sL) as r > a.
The effect of income inequality on utility is not apparent from the above analytic, and
we further explore this in our quantitative analysis in Section 5.
4 Open Economy
We now study the implications of international trade and extend the above model to
many trading countries and trade costs. We focus on the properties of income distribution
and trade integration in the case of symmetric countries.
We consider n countries each with the same population size N and worker skill distri-
bution sH and sL with the probability H and L 2 (0; 1) (H + L = 1). Earnings in each
country are respectively wsH and wsL where w is the local wage. In each country, each
firm produces a unique variety ! under monopolistic competition using an idiosyncratic
marginal cost c, which yields a variable cost cw. Firms now produce for the local and
foreign locations and incur an iceberg trade cost   1 > 0 per unit of exported good. That
is, every unit of exported good costs cw. Firms incur no trade cost on their local sales.
In each country, each of a mass M of entrants pays a cost wf to enter so that it obtains a
distinct variety ! and draws a cost parameter c from the cumulative probability distrib-
ution G. Again, the measure of goods produced in each country d! is equal to MdG(c).
One can then replace the label of a variety ! by its production cost c. Given the symmetric
setting, all economic variables are equal and we can normalize all local wages to one.
Because of the symmetry, the aggregate demand for imports or local goods is given
by the expression Q (p) in (4). A firm producing with cost c makes a profit (p  c)Q (p)
for its home sales and (p  c)Q (p) for its exports. Under monopolistic competition,
the firm chooses the prices that maximize its total profit taking all equilibrium choke
prices as givens. At fixed choke prices, demands in each country are independent of each
other so that optimal prices in a country are obtained independently of the prices in other
countries (as in the closed economy model, see Proposition 1). Optimal local prices p (c)
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are expressed as before as
p (c) =
(
(p^HLc)
1=2 if c  c^
(p^Hc)
1=2 if c > c^
;
where c^ is given by (6), while optimal export prices are simply given by p (c). The
only difference is that the highest cost firm that sells to a foreign high (resp. low) income
group has a cost equal to p^H= (resp. c^= ). The equilibrium price levels and indices can
be computed as before and reduced to the equilibrium conditions
M =
sH
eH (p^H ; p^L)
=
sL
eL (p^H ; p^L)
; (24)
where
eL (p^H ; p^L) =
Z c^
0

p^L   p^1=2HLc1=2

dG (c) + (n  1)
Z c^=
0

p^L   p^1=2HL (c)1=2

dG (c)
eH (p^H ; p^L) =
Z c^
0

p^H   p^1=2HLc1=2

dG (c) +
Z p^H
c^

p^H   p^1=2H c1=2

dG (c)
+ (n  1)
"Z c^=
0

p^H   p^1=2HL (c)1=2

dG (c) +
Z p^H=
c^=

p^H   p^1=2H (c)1=2

dG (c)
#
express the consumers’ average expenditure per available variety.
The firm’s profit includes its home and foreign sales:  (c) = (p(c)  c)Q (p(c)) +
(n  1) (p(c)  c)Q (p(c)). Free entry implies that E [ (c)] = f . We write this as
 (p^H ; p^L) =
f
N
; (25)
where  (p^H ; p^L) = E [ (c)] =N; or equivalently,
 (p^H ; p^L) =
Z c^
0

p^
1=2
HL   c1=2
2
dG (c) +
Z p^H
c^
H

p^
1=2
H   c1=2
2
dG (c)
+ (n  1)
"Z c^=
0

p^
1=2
HL   (c)1=2
2
dG (c) +
Z p^H=
c^=
H

p^
1=2
H   (c)1=2
2
dG (c)
#
:
The mass of surviving firms in a country is equal to MG(p^H).
As in the closed economy, the three market conditions in (24) and (25) determine the
choke prices (p^H ; p^L) and mass of entrants M . The existence of an equilibrium can be
proven in the same way. Therefore, we can conclude that there always exists a trade equilib-
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rium under condition (A1).
Using a Pareto productivity distribution and a similar procedure for simplifying equi-
librium conditions, we obtain
0 = 

r;; H ;
sH
sL

(26)
p^L = c

+1
M

f
N [1 + (n  1)  ]
 1
+1
[ 2 (r;; H)]
  1
+1 (27)
M =
sLN
f
 2 (r;; H)
 1 (r;; H)
; (28)
where we used the definition p^H = rp^L and ,  1, and  2 are the same functions as in
the closed-economy model. Therefore, Propositions 2, 4 and 5 also hold in the open economy.
In the following we investigate the equilibrium properties under a Pareto productivity
distribution.
4.1 Trade integration
What is the impact of trade integration? From equilibrium conditions (26) and (28), we
observe that the trade cost  and number of countries n do not affect the determination
of the choke price ratio r and the mass of entrants M . Fixing all parameters except trade
cost and number of countries, we can use conditions (26), (27) and (28) to write
p^L
p^AL
=
p^H
p^AH
=
p^HL
p^AHL
=
c^
c^A
=

1
1 + (n  1)  
 1
+1
and
M
MA
= 1; (29)
where we denote the autarky situation with the superscript A (i.e. when n = 1 or  =1).
The trade cost and number of countries only affect the choke price and cut-off through
the term (n  1)  . Hence, an increase in the number of countries is equivalent to a
decrease in trade cost such that
 ln  =  1

 ln (n  1)
where  denotes the difference in the variables between two cases. Accordingly, the ad-
dition of a new country in a trade network will be equivalent to a drop in trade costs.
But, because the term n  1 is not proportional, the equivalent drop in trade cost becomes
larger in smaller trade networks. Since larger trade networks and lower trade costs have
the same effect on the choke prices (p^H , p^L; p^HL) and cut-off c^, we can combine the discus-
sion on trade costs and networks for all the variables that are directly determined by the
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term (n  1)  .
It can be seen from (29) that lowering trade costs diminishes both the choke prices
p^L and p^H compared to the autarky situation. The prices of domestic sales relative to
autarkic ones depend on whether the production cost of the good lies above or below the
thresholds c^ and c^A. More specifically, the ratio p (c) =pA (c) simplifies to
 
p^HL=p^
A
HL
1=2
if c  c^,  p^H=p^AHL1=2 if c^ < c  c^A and  p^H=p^AH1=2 if c > c^A. After some algebraic
substitutions, we have
p (c)
pA (c)
=
8>><>>:

1
1+(n 1) 
 1
2(+1)
if c =2 (c^; c^A)
rA
HrA+L
1=2 
1
1+(n 1) 
 12(+1)
if c 2 (c^; c^A)
:
So, a fall in trade cost reduces the prices of all domestic products except those with
costs in the neighborhood of c^ for which prices jump upwards. The intuition is that a
lower trade cost brings not only better market access and market sizes but also more
competition. Competition reduces the choke prices and therefore the demands faced by
every firm. Given lower demands, some firms are enticed to switch to the higher income
group target. Similarly, the import prices relative to the autarky prices of firms with same
cost c are given by
p (c)
pA (c)
=
8>><>>:
 1=2

1
1+(n 1) 
 1
2(+1)
if c =2 (c^=; c^A=)
 1=2

rA
HrA+L
1=2 
1
1+(n 1) 
 12(+1)
if c 2 (c^=; c^A=)
: (30)
Thus, lower trade costs also reduce the destination prices of imported varieties except
for those goods produced at costs close to c^= . The intuition is the same: lower trade
costs increase competition so that product demands shift down and entice exporters to set
lower prices unless they switch to the higher income group target. To sum up, lower trade
costs diminish destination prices of local and imported varieties except for those goods produced at
costs close to c^ and c^= .
From the previous paragraph, we infer that imported goods are more expensive than
local ones. Indeed, on the one hand, an importer producing abroad at a cost c =2 (c^=; c^)
sets its (destination) prices  1=2 times higher than a local producer producing at the same
cost. That is, p (c) =  1=2p (c) if c =2 (c^=; c^). On the other hand, producers with cost
c 2 [c^=; c^] have different targets in their local and export markets: they target the whole
population in the local market but focus on the high income group in the export markets.
The difference between the prices of local and imported goods is even higher. That is,
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p (c) =  1=2p (c) > p (c) if c =2 (c^=; c^).
From (29), a fall in trade cost does not affect entry M . However, firm selection be-
comes tougher as the total mass of surviving firms in a country, MG (p^H), falls since p^H
decreases. By contrast, the total number of goods consumed by the poor and the rich in-
creases with smaller trade costs. Indeed, the total numbers of consumed goods are given
by
j
H j = MG (p^H) + (n  1)MG (p^H=) and j
Lj = MG (c^) + (n  1)MG (c^=) :
Under a Pareto cost distribution, this simplifies to
j
H j
j
AH j
=
j
Lj
j
AL j
=

1 + (n  1)   1+1 ;
where the superscript A again refers to autarky. Thus, as trade costs fall, both the rich and
the poor consume a wider set of goods. However, the measures of their baskets of goods keep
the same proportionality between each other.
All the previous results are valid for both lower trade costs and larger trade networks.
Things are somewhat different for the variables that are not solely determined by the
term (n  1)  . This is the case of the quantity of consumed goods and the number of
varieties.
Let us first look at the number of local and imported goods sold to the whole local
population: MG (c^) and MG (c^=). This is also the number of local and imported goods
consumed by the poor. From (29), we see that the cut-off c^ always falls with smaller
 and larger n. Hence, trade integration leads to a reduction of the set of local goods
consumed by the poor. Also, it readily comes that the cutoff c^= drops with larger n.
This is because an enlargement of the trade network entices consumers to buy imports
from new countries to substitute for existing imports. However, it can be verified that
the cutoff c^= rises with smaller  . The poor therefore purchase a wider set of foreign
goods because those goods are less costly to ship. Hence, lower trade costs and larger trade
networks have opposite effects on the poor’s basket of imports from a specific country. However,
it can be shown that the total set of imports (n  1)MG (c^=) expands with n.
We now look at the individual consumption. By (1), the individual consumption for a
good by a rich or poor worker can be written as
qh (c) =

p^h
p (c)
  1

; h 2 fH;Lg
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if p (c)  p^h and zero otherwise. The same expression with p (c) holds for imports.
Since local goods are cheaper than imports, it is clear that individuals consume larger
quantities of the former than the latter. On the one hand, compared to autarky, the con-
sumption of local goods produced at cost c is given by the following relationship:
qh (c) + 1
qAh (c) + 1
=
p^h
p^Ah
pA (c)
p (c)
; h 2 fH;Lg: (31)
Applying the above results yields
qh (c) + 1
qAh (c) + 1
=
8><>:

1
1+(n 1) 
 1
2(+1)
if c =2 (c^; c^A)
rA
HrA+L
 1=2 
1
1+(n 1) 
 1
2(+1)
if c 2 (c^; c^A)
; (32)
h 2 fH;Lg. Hence, local consumption falls with lower trade costs and a larger trade network.
On the other hand, the consumption of imports produced at cost c is given by the re-
lationship (31) with p (c) replacing p (c). Because imported goods are more expensive
than local ones, consumers purchase a lower quantity of each good. Indeed, the expres-
sions in (32) must then be divided by  1=2 and the cut-off intervals replaced by (c^=; c^A=).
As a result, one can verify that the [qh (c) + 1] =

qAh (c) + 1

decreases with larger n but
increases with smaller trade costs for any cost slightly away from the cost threshold c^= .
The presence of imports from a new country entices consumers to substitute for existing
imports. Also, a fall in trade cost reduces import prices and entices consumers to pur-
chase a larger quantity of each imported good. Hence, trade integration does not have the
same effect on individual consumption of imports whenever it stems from lower trade cost or a
larger trade network.
We summarize the above results in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Lower trade costs and larger trade networks (i) reduce product prices everywhere
except those of the firms switching to target the higher income group, (ii) diminish the mass of
surviving firms whereas the mass of entrants is unchanged, (iii) expand the set of goods consumed
by both the rich and the poor, and (iv) reduce the quantity and the set of individual consumption
of local goods. Also, lower trade costs increase the quantity and the set of individual consumption
of imports whereas larger trade networks reduce them.
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From the derivation in Appendix G, equilibrium utility levels can be written as
U (sH) =
M (1 + (n  1) ) p^L
cM

a ln

r1=2 (Hr + L)
 1=2

+
r
2

(33)
U (sL) =
M (1 + (n  1) ) p^L
cM

a
2
  a ln
h
1  1=2H

a+ (Har)
1=2
i
: (34)
By using (27) and comparing (22-23) and (33-34), we have
U (sh) =
 
1 + (n  1)  1+1 UA (sh) ;
where h = H;L, and UA (sh) denotes the utility level under autarky. Trade integration
therefore raises equilibrium utility levels of high and low income groups in the same
proportion. The utility difference between those groups therefore rises in that same pro-
portion.
How does the above utility increase due to trade integration compare to an increase in
income? Let us fix income ratio sH=sL so that r and a remain constant. A percentage de-
crease in trade cost yields the same change in utility resulting from a percentage increase
in average income if it satisfies the following relationship:
d lnU (sh)
d ln 

sL fixed
d ln  =  

d lnU (sh)
d ln sL

 fixed
d ln sL.
We have

d lnU (sh)
d ln 

sL fixed
=
d ln (1 + (n  1) )
d ln 
+
d ln p^L
d ln 
=   
+ 1
(n  1)  
1 + (n  1)   .
From (28) and (33), we observe that U (sh) is proportional to M , which, in turn, is propor-
tional to sL. Hence, we have 
d lnU (sh)
d ln sL

 fixed
= 1.
Using the above results, we obtain
  d ln sL
d ln 
=
h
d lnU(sh)
d ln 
i
sL fixed
 
h
d lnU(sh)
d ln sL
i
 fixed
=

+ 1
(n  1)  
1 + (n  1)   .
This figure is to be interpreted as follows: a one percent decrease in trade cost  is
equivalent to a  percent increase in average income, keeping constant the income in-
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equality. Because utility U (sh) is proportional to income,  is also the negative of the
elasticity of utility to trade cost. For example, with n = 2,  = 1:7 and  = 3:03,14 we have
 = 0:13. That is, a 1% fall in trade cost is equivalent to a 0:13% percent rise in average
income, were income ratio (sH=sL) constant. The effect is nevertheless stronger for lower
trade costs and larger trade networks.
4.2 Income Distribution
We know by the structure of (26) to (28) that Proposition 4 holds in the open economy.
That is, a mean-preserving spread of the income distribution increases the choke price of
each country’s high income group, reduces the country’s (unweighted) average produc-
tivity and reduces the set of goods consumed by the poor relative to that by the rich in
each country. The question then becomes whether lower trade costs amplify or attenuate
the effect of a mean-preserving spread of the income distribution.
A mean-preserving spread of the income distribution (higher v at constant s) raises
the highest income sH and reduces the lowest income sL. In the open economy, each
country’s (unweighted) average productivity is related to the opposite of its average costR p^H
0
cMdG (c) =
R p^H
0
MdG (c), or equivalently,
R p^H
0
cdG (c) =
R p^H
0
dG (c), which increases with
a higher choke price p^H but is independent of the number of entrants, M . Hence, we need
only study the effect of a higher p^H , irrespective of the numbers of entrants and firms.
Because p^H = rp^L, we must discuss the effects of the mean-preserving spread on r and
p^L in (26) and (27). Let us consider the changes in income inequality sH=sL from saH=s
a
L
to sbH=s
b
L. By (26), the choke price ratio shifts from r
a to rb where the superscripts a and b
refer to the respective income ratios. By (27), we also have
p^aL
p^bL
=

 2 (r
a;; H)
 2 (rb;; H)
  1
+1
;
which is independent of trade cost  . Multiplying all terms by ra=rb we can write
p^aH
p^bH
=
rap^aL
rbp^bL
=
ra
rb

 2 (r
a;; H)
 2 (rb;; H)
  1
+1
;
where the first equality stems from the definition of r = p^H=p^L. Hence the ratios of choke
prices are also independent of trade costs  . Finally, since we know that choke prices are
lower for smaller trade costs, we can infer that the difference between the choke prices
p^aH and p^
b
H must also be smaller for smaller trade costs. As a result, the average cost
14These parameter values are the ones adopted in our quantitative analysis in Section 5.
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R p^H
0
cdG (c) =
R p^H
0
dG (c) increases less with lower trade cost when income inequality is
higher. Since the opposite holds for the average productivity, we can state the following:
Proposition 7. A mean-preserving spread of income distribution reduces each country’s (un-
weighted) average productivity by a smaller amount when trade costs are smaller.
Stated differently, income redistribution from the rich to the poor improves each coun-
try’s average productivity less under deeper trade integration. Also, the effects of income
inequality on average productivity are the strongest under autarky ( ! 1). The in-
tuition is that trade expands product diversity and induces tougher firm selection. The
selection cost-cutoffs are smaller under trade so that the mass of surviving firms MG(p^H)
is smaller but those firms are more cost effective. The number of unsold goods is larger
within the global economy than n autarkic economies. Hence, when the rich earn a higher
income, they can spread their consumption towards the cheapest unsold goods in all
countries rather than having to concentrate on domestic unsold goods. In the end, con-
sumed goods are produced at a lower cost.
5 Quantitative Analysis
5.1 Calibration
To calibrate the model, we attribute values to the nine parameters (H ; sL; sH ; cM ; f; ; ; n;N).
We calibrate on a 2014-15 US-like baseline economy where top 10% income individuals
earn 7:9 more than the bottom 90% so that we set oH = 0:10 and s
o
H=s
o
L = 7:9 where
the symbol o denotes the baseline values.15 Without loss of generality, we can normalize
the population size and the cost to unity such that N o = 1 and coM = 1. We focus on
two (blocks of) symmetric countries (no = 2) and set the iceberg trade cost to the value
 o = 1:7 as estimated in Novy (2013).16 We identify the model on three additional empir-
ical relationships about firm markups, survival and employment rates. First, following
empirical studies,17 we impose an average markup on local sales mrkupo of 115%. That
15The income ratio is calculated from top 10 percent income share data in 2014 for the US from the World
Inequality Database.
16For examples, Novy (2013) estimated that the trade costs  in 2000 between the US and Germany and
between the US and the UK are 1:70 and 1:63, respectively. Using the same approach, the same set of
estimates in 2014 reported by the World Bank’s International Trade Costs data set are 1:723 and 1:704.
17For example, using Taiwanese manufacturing data and the markup-estimation approach by De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012), Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015) find an unweighted average markup of 1:13.
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is,
mrkupo =

  1=2
264
h
(oHr + 
o
L)
1=2   r1=2
i h
(oHr + 
o
L)
1=2   o1=2H r1=2
i2 1

1  o1=2H
2 1
r
+ 1
375 ,
where the right-hand side is the unweighted average markup (
R bpH
0
p
c
dG). This identity
gives a relationship between  and r as does the identity (26). Solving simultaneously
those two identities yields the values of ro and o. In turn, we have the values  o1 
 1 (r
o;o; oH) and  
o
2   2 (ro;o; oH). We finally make use the value of the firm’s survival
rate survo = G (p^H) of 90%18 and average employment per firm emplo = N=(MG(p^H)) of
66 workers as reported in the 2015 US census data (148  106 workers in 2:22  106 firms
having more than 5 employees). Using (27) and (28), we compute
survo =

1 +  oo
f
r (o+1)o  
o
2
  o
o+1
emplo  survo = f
sL
 o1
 o2
;
which yield f o and soL. This calibration process permits the recovery of the baseline econ-
omy parameter values ro = 1:539, o = 3:03, f o = 0:00887 and soL = 0:00036. In turn
this yields ao = 0:860 (= bc=bpL). As an external validity check, we compute a 83% share of
domestic expenditure on domestic goods, which fits well the reality of the US economy.19
5.2 Effects of Income Inequality
Table 2 presents the values of economic variables when workers incomes (or skills) in-
creasingly spread about their mean. Recall that a mean-preserving spread can be con-
structed by (14) and (15) with vo and so given by the above calibrated value. Each column
in Table 2 corresponds to, from left to right, v = 0  vo; 1
4
vo; 2
4
vo; :::; 6
4
vo, respectively. The
first row presents the value of the income ratio that rises from 1 (second column) to the
baseline model 7:9 (sixth column) and then to 3=2 of this value (eighth column). The sec-
ond row displays the respective values of the Gini coefficients. The next three lines show
the value of skill endowment and their mean for the sake of completeness.
18We take the average exit rate as 0:1. See, for example, Klepper and Thompson (2006).
19Using information on domestic absorption and imports in Penn World Table 9.0, one can easily calculate
the domestic expenditure share, and this share for the US in 2014 was 0:828.
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sH=sL 1. 2.14 3.57 5.41 7.9 11.42 16.8
Gini 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.37 0.46 0.55
Top income share 0.10 0.19 0.28 0.38 0.47 0.56 0.65
sL (thousands) 0.60 0.54 0.48 0.42 0.36 0.30 0.23
sH (thousands) 0.60 1.16 1.71 2.26 2.82 3.37 3.93
Mean (HsH + LsL; thousands) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
Ave. productivity (weighted by cost) 2.73 2.72 2.71 2.67 2.61 2.53 2.43
UL vs. UL base 1.55 1.41 1.28 1.14 1.00 0.86 0.71
UH vs. UH base 0.51 0.76 0.90 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.91
Equivalent variation L (relative to soL) 0.69 0.51 0.34 0.17 0.00 -0.16 -0.33
Equivalent variation H (relative to soH) -0.30 -0.15 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.06
Table 2: Quantitative impact of mean-preserving spreads of income.
In Section 3 our empirical analysis suggests a negative correlation between average
productivity and income dispersion. The theoretical analysis in Section 3.4 shows that
the average productivity falls with mean-preserving spreads. Because further analysis on
productivity is analytically difficult, we here resort to quantitative analysis. The seventh
row in Table 2 shows reports the quantitative values for average productivity weighted
by cost, given by R p^H
0
(1=c)cQ (p (c)) dG(c)R p^H
0
cQ (p (c)) dG(c)
,
which simplifies the total output over total cost. The observation of this row confirms our
previous analyses: average productivity falls with stronger income inequality. Ceteris
paribus, rich consumers purchase larger quantities per good and add goods that are more
costly to make into their consumption basket as their income rises. As richer consumers
buy greater quantities and larger numbers of goods, their effect on total consumption
dominates so that firms on average produce more costly goods.
The eighth and ninth lines of Table 2 compare the achieved utility levels compared to
the baseline levels. The poor’s utility monotonically falls with a mean-preserving spread
of income distribution as they get lower incomes. Interestingly, the rich’s utility first in-
creases and then decreases with higher income dispersion. Excessive income inequality
may thus turn out to be a disadvantage for the rich. This intuition balances the effects
of their larger purchasing power and larger number of expensive products. First, when
income inequality strengthens, the rich get larger incomes and raise their demand so that
they are willing to consume more in quantity and number of products. Second, income
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inequality reduces the poor’s income and demand. This entices some firms with costs
lower than c^ shift their consumer target from all individuals to only the rich ones. As a
consequence, those firms raise their prices, which negatively affects the rich’s consump-
tion. In other words, for such products, the rich can no longer “hide behind the poor”
and benefit from the low prices targeted to poorer people. Firms’ price discrimination
further hits the rich. Price hikes can be large because richer individuals have lower de-
mand elasticity. One can then observe from the eighth row of Table 2 that the rich gain
from larger income discrepancies only for income ratios sH=sL lower than the baseline
level 7:9: Above that level, they are hurt by the above price hikes.
Finally, the last two rows of Table 2 display the relative equivalent variations as the per-
centage of additional income needed in the baseline model20 to match the utility level
obtained in another inequality configuration. To allow comparison, those measures take
the baseline equilibrium price system and its product space as givens. Although they are
partial equilibrium measures, relative equivalent variations are better suited to express
the magnitude of the impact of welfare inequality on the poor and rich. Hence, going
from the sixth to the fifth column means moving the baseline income ratio of 7:9 to 5:41.
This implies a fall of 9 points in the Gini coefficient, a rise of the poor’s income from 0:36
to 0:42 and a fall in the rich’s income from 2:82 to 2:26, which amounts respectively to
about 16% and  20% of their baseline incomes. However, the relative equivalent vari-
ations are 17% and  1% respectively for the poor and rich. Hence, the negative impact
on the rich is much lower than their actual income change. In the same vein, going from
the sixth to the second column implies the most drastic move from the baseline model to
full income redistribution (equal incomes). The poor’s income increases from 0:36 to 0:60,
that is, for about 67% of their baseline income. The rich’s income moves down from 2:82
to 0:60, which is a 78% income drop. However, in terms of equivalent variations, the rich
lose only 30% while the poor gain 69% of their purchasing power. Finally, going from the
sixth to the seventh or eighth column implies higher inequality compared to the baseline
model. Yet, this move harms both the poor and rich in terms of utility level and equivalent
variation. This is undesirable for either the social planner or each income group.
5.3 Effects of Trade Cost
Table 3 presents the main economic indicators for alternative trade costs, keeping the
other parameters of the baseline model. Going from the left to the right hand, the columns
successively report the cases of free trade,  = 1, a 10% fall in trade cost on the baseline
20That is, given the set of consumed goods and prices at the baseline.
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model, the trade cost of the baseline model,  = 1:7, and the trade cost at the autarky limit,
 ! 1. (Weighted) average productivity falls with higher trade costs as less productive
firms survive in the markets. It can be shown that this property also holds when average
productivity is weighted by sales. Lowering trade cost by 10% from the baseline model
augments productivity by 1:5% (= 2:652=2:612   1). Going from autarky to free trade
increases average productivity by 16% (=2:497=2:965  1). The result that trade liberaliza-
tion induces higher average productivity is consistent with the firm-selection literature a
la Melitz (2003). The expenditure share on domestic goods falls as the economy moves
from autarky to free trade. Lowering trade cost by 10% reduces it by 6% (= 0:784=0:833 1)
and substantially raises the share of imports by 29% (= (1  0:784)=(1  0:833)  1)).
The fourth and fifth rows show the low and high income groups’ utility levels relative
to their baseline level. As noted in Section 4.1, utility levels are affected in the same
proportions by trade cost if the income of each group is held constant. Lowering trade
cost by 10% raises utility by 1:5% while moving from autarky to free trade increases it by
about 18% (1:135=0:956   1). The negative of the elasticity of utility to trade cost is thus
0:15 (= 1:5=1:5), which is quite close to the point elasticity  = 0:13 mentioned in Section
4.1.
The last two rows display the relative equivalent variations. Lowering trade cost by
10% is equivalent to an increase of 1:8% of the poor’s income and an increase of 1:0% of
the rich’s. Moving from autarky  = 1 to the baseline trade cost  = 1:7 is equivalent
to increases of the poor and rich’s real incomes by 5:4% (= 1= (1  0:052)   1) and 2:9%
(= 1= (1  0:028)   1), respectively. Trade liberalization therefore benefits more the poor
because the poor consume more heavily on traded goods. A similar point was made by
Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016).
Trade cost  1.0 1.790% 1.7 1
Ave. productivity (weighted by cost) 2.965 2.652 2.612 2.497
Expenditure share on domestic goods 0.5 0.784 0.833 1.
UL vs. UL base 1.135 1.015 1.000 0.956
UH vs. UH base 1.135 1.015 1.000 0.956
Equivalent variation L (relative to soL) 0.160 0.018 0.000 -0.052
Equivalent variation H (relative to soH) 0.087 0.010 0.000 -0.028
Table 3 Quantitative impact of trade cost
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a theory of how income inequality may affect aggregate produc-
tivity and welfare in a global economy via selection under a non-homothetic preference
with pro-competitive effects. We find that there is a negative cross effect of one group’s
income on the other group’s consumption. We also find that a mean-preserving spread of
income reduces average productivity (both weighted and unweighted) through the soft-
ening of firms’ selection and the shuffling of the mass of consumption from low-cost to
high-cost goods.
In the quantitative analysis, it is shown that an excessively large mean-preserving
spread of income may harm the rich. Moreover, when measuring welfare in real terms by
equivalent variation, we find that a reallocation of nominal income increases the poor’s
real income more than the fall of the rich’s real income. Taken together, regardless of
whether efficiency is measured in aggregate productivity or welfare, we find the contrary
to the equity-efficiency trade-off is true in our model.
Our result – that the negative effect of income inequality on average productivity is
mitigated by international trade – is intriguing because most theoretical and empirical
studies point to the negative effect of globalization on equity. Of course there is actually
no conflict because the directions of the causal relationships are different. Our model
not only is consistent with the general understanding that trade helps the poor in terms
of consumption, but it also suggests another positive side of trade: with higher income,
the rich can spread their extra consumption over goods from various countries, instead
of having to concentrate their consumption domestically under autarky. Collectively, a
more efficient part of each country’s cost distribution is sampled in the presence of trade.
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Appendix A: Consumers’ demands
Individuals are endowed with utility function U =
R
!2
 ln (1 + q (!)) d! over the com-
modity space 
  R. Note that firm entry limits the mass of commodities that are of-
fered. Let 
 be the set of commodities that are actually offered and associated with a
price p (!), ! 2 
. Other commodities ! 2 
n
 are not offered and cannot be con-
sumed so that q(!) = 0 for ! 2 
n
. An individual in the income group h chooses the
consumption q (!), ! 2 
 that maximizes her utility U subject to her budget constraintR
!2
 p (!) q (!) d! = sh. The Lagrangian function of individual h with income sh is there-
fore defined as
Lh =
Z
!2

ln (1 + q (!)) d! + h

sh  
Z
!2

p (!) q (!) d!

,

h  R. This is a concave function so that the following first-order condition yields the
consumer’s best consumption choice:
@L
@q(!)
= 1
q(!)+1
  hp (!) = 0 if q (!) > 0
@L
@q(!)
= 1
q(!)+1
  hp (!) < 0 if q (!) = 0.
The set of consumed varieties is given by 
h  f! : q (!) > 0g = f! : p (!) < 1=hg. For
! 2 
h, the first-order condition entails
qh (!) =
1
hp (!)
  1;
and thus
h =
R
!2
h d!
sh +
R
!2
h p (!) d!
:
Substituting h back into the demand function, we obtain the individual demand function
qh (!) =
p^h
p (!)
  1;
where
p^h  1
h
=
sh + Ph
j
hj
is the choke price of the consumer with income sh, Ph 
R
!2
h p (!) d! is the aggregate
price index for the goods consumed by s and j
 (s)j = R
!2
h d! is the measure of the
set of goods consumed by individual h. Combining the above results, we obtain (1) and
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(2). Note that the choke price p^h is the highest price that h is willing to pay to purchase
any nonnegative amount of a variety. When sh increases, h falls and p^h rises so that 
h
expands. As a result, one has sH  sL () sH  sL () p^H  p^L.
Finally given that q(!) = 0; ! =2 
h, the consumer’s utility can successively be rewrit-
ten as
Uh =
Z
!2
h
ln (1 + q (!)) d! +
Z
!2
n
h
ln (1) d! =
Z
!2
h
ln (1 + q (!)) d!.
The indirect utility is thus equal to
Vh =
Z
!2
h
ln

sh + Ph
j
hj
1
p (!)

d!. (35)
Appendix B: Firms’ choices
The problem for a firm with cost c is
max
p
 = (p  c)Q (p)
=
8<: (p  c)HN

p^H
p
  1

if p 2 [p^L; p^H)
(p  c)N

p^HL
p
  1

if p 2 [0; p^L)
:
For p 2 [0; p^L), the firm sells to both groups and chooses the price p(c) = c1=2 (p^HL)1=2
and markup (p^HL=c)
1=2. The price increases and the markup decreases with higher mar-
ginal costs c, showing a pro-competitive effect. The firm earns a profit equal to HL(c) =
N
h
(p^HL)
1=2   c1=2
i2
. For p 2 [p^L; p^H), a firm sells only to high income consumers and sets
a price p(c) = c1=2p^1=2H and markup (p^H=c)
1=2. Prices increase and markups decrease in c.
The firm gets a profit equal to H(c) = HN
h
(p^H)
1=2   c1=2
i2
. The firm chooses to charge
p(c) = c1=2 (p^HL)
1=2 if and only if HL(c)  H(c), which is equivalent to
c1=2  c^1=2  (p^HL)
1=2   (H p^H)1=2
1  1=2H
: (36)
This argument yields (6) and (5). Observe that pH > pHL for any c. So, there is an upward
jump of the price schedule p(c) at c^.
In the product market equilibrium, it must be that each income group purchases the
goods that are targeted to them. In particular, the low income consumers should buy
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only the goods produced at cost in the range [0; c^]. This means that their choke price p^L
should satisfy p (c^  0) < p^L < p (c^+ 0). We show that this condition holds. Indeed,
since p(c^   0) = c^1=2 (p^HL)1=2 and p(c^ + 0) = c^1=2p^1=2H the previous condition becomes
c^1=2 (p^HL)
1=2 < p^L < c^
1=2p^
1=2
H . Plugging the value of c^ and defining r = p^H=p^L with r > 1
since p^H > p^L, we have the following inequalities
(Hr + L)  (Hr (Hr + L))1=2 < 1  1=2H < ((Hr + L) r)1=2   (H)1=2 r.
Because H +L = 1, we have that the left-hand side and right-hand side are equal to the
middle term for r = 1. It can be shown that the left-hand side falls with higher r while
the right-hand side rises with it. Hence the inequalities are always satisfied.
For all goods to be supplied by firm with cost c to poor individuals, it must also hold
that c < p^L. This is obtained if c^ < p^L. Plugging the value of c^ and using r = p^H=p^L we
have the condition:
((Hr + L))
1=2   (Hr)1=2 < 1  1=2H ,
where the left-hand side decreases with larger r and is equal to the right-hand side at
r = 1. So the condition is always satisfied.
Appendix C: Existence
The equilibrium is represented by the vector of variables (p^H ; p^L;M) with p^H  p^L  0
and M > 0 that satisfy the market conditions (8) and (9) and entry conditions (12):
eH (p^H ; p^L)  sH
M
= 0 (37)
eL (p^H ; p^L)  sL
M
= 0 (38)
 (p^H ; p^L)  f
N
= 0, (39)
where
eH (p^H ; p^L) =
Z c^
0

p^H   (H p^H + Lp^L)1=2 c1=2

dG (c) +
Z p^H
c^

p^H   p^1=2H c1=2

dG (c)
eL (p^H ; p^L) =
Z c^
0

p^L   (H p^H + Lp^L)1=2 c1=2

dG (c)
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are the consumers’ average expenditures per available variety and
 (p^H ; p^L) =
Z p^H
0
max

(H p^H + Lp^L)
1=2   c1=2
2
,H

p^
1=2
H   c1=2
2
dG (c)
is the expected operational profit before entry. In those equations c^ is implicitly given by
the solution of
c^1=2 =
(p^HL)
1=2   (H p^H)1=2
1  1=2H
with @c^=@p^H < 0 < @c^=@p^H . It can readily be shown that H > 0, L > 0 and eLL > 0 > eLH
where ehl = @eh=@p^l and l = @=@p^l, h; l 2 fH;Lg.
Using (37) and (38), we can rewrite the equilibrium conditions as
H(p^H ; p^L;M) M   HsH + LsL
HeH + LeL
= 0 (40)
F (p^H ; p^L)  eH
sH
  eL
sL
= 0 (41)
 (p^H ; p^L)   (p^H ; p^L)  f
N
= 0. (42)
The equilibrium is then given by the vector (p^H ; p^L;M) that solves (40), (41) and (42).
Note that the choke prices are solutions of (41) and (42) while the mass of entrants is the
solution of (40) at equilibrium choke prices.
To show the existence of the equilibrium, note that since the eH , eL and  are contin-
uous functions of (p^H ; p^L;M), the expressions in conditions (42), (40) and (41) are also
continuous on R+3: It then suffices to prove that each expression has an opposite sign on
two points in the support of (p^H ; p^L;M) 2 R+3 with p^H  p^L  0 and M > 0.
First, suppose that (p^H ; p^L;M) = (y; 0;M). Then, c^ = 0 so that eH(y; 0) =
R y
0
 
y   y1=2c1=2
dG (c) > 0 and eL(y; 0) = 0. We compute
(y; 0) = H
Z y
0
 
y1=2   c1=22 dG (c)  f
N
H(y; 0;M) = M   HsH + LsL
H
R y
0
(y   y1=2c1=2) dG (c)
F (y; 0) =
1
sH
Z y
0
 
y   y1=2c1=2 dG (c) .
If y is small enough, we have (y; 0) < 0, H(y; 0;M) < 0 and F (y; 0) > 0.
Second, we consider that G(c) has a bounded support and finite mean. That is, G :
[0; cM ] ! [0; 1] such that E(c) =
R cM
0
cdG (c) < 1. We define p^L = x, p^H = rx; p^HL =
35
(Hr + L)x and c^ = axwhere 1  r <1 and a1=2 
h
(Hr + L)
1=2   1=2H r1=2
i
=

1  1=2H

2
(0; 1]. We further set x such that cM < ax < x < rx. This implies that
R rx
0
dG =
R cM
0
dG = 1,R ax
0
c1=2dG =
R cM
0
c1=2dG (c) = E(c1=2), and
R rx
ax
c1=2dG (c) =
R cM
cM
c1=2dG (c) = 0. So, when
(p^H ; p^L) = (rx; x) ; we have
eH (rx; x) = rx  (Hr + L)1=2 x1=2E(c1=2)
eL (rx; x) = x  (Hr + L)1=2 x1=2E(c1=2),
while
 (rx; x) =
h
(Hr + L)x  2 (Hr + L)1=2 x1=2E(c1=2) + E(c)
i
  f
N
H(rx; x;M) = M   HsH + LsL
(Hr + L)x  (Hr + L)1=2 x1=2E(c1=2)
F (rx; x) =

r
sH
  1
sL

x+

1
sL
  1
sH

(Hr + L)
1=2 x1=2E(c1=2).
For sufficiently large x, we have  (rx; x) > 0 and H(rx; x;M) > 0 while F (rx; x) < 0 if
r < sH=sL.
We can then choose five scalars, x large enough, y small enough, r < sH=sL, M 0 >
0 and M 00 > 0; such that the functions ; H and F have opposite signs at the points
(p^H ; p^L;M) = (rx; x;M
0) and (y; 0;M 00). This proves the existence of an equilibrium.
Appendix D: Income and Demand
In this appendix, we show how changes in income affect choke prices. Differentiating
totally (42) and (41), we have"
eHHs
 1
H   eLHs 1L eHLs 1H   eLLs 1L
H L
#

"
dp^H
dp^L
#
=
"
 eHds 1H + eLds 1L
0
#
where ehl  @eh=@p^l and l  @=@p^l, h; l 2 fH;Lg. In Appendix C, it has been shown that
H > 0, L > 0 and eLL > 0 > eLH . Under the assumption eHH > 0 > eHL, the determinant
of the matrix in the above LHS,  =
 
eHHs
 1
H   eLHs 1L

L  
 
eHLs
 1
H   eLLs 1L

H is
strictly positive. We have"
dp^H=ds
 1
H
dp^L=ds
 1
H
#
=
eH

"
 L
H
#
and
"
dp^H=ds
 1
L
dp^L=ds
 1
L
#
=
eL

"
L
 H
#
.
36
Noting that eh = sh= (M) by (37) and (38) so that
 
dp^h=ds
 1
h

= ehp^hM
 
d lnp^h=d lns
 1
h

;
h = H;L, we rewrite the above expression as"
d lnp^H=d lnsH
d lnp^L=d lnsH
#
=
1

"
L
 H
#
and
"
d lnp^H=d lnsL
d lnp^L=d lnsL
#
=
1

"
 L
H
#
,
yielding
d lnp^H
d lnsH
=  d lnp^H
d lnsL
=
1

L
p^H
> 0 and
d lnp^L
d lnsL
=  d lnp^L
d lnsH
=
1

H
p^L
> 0. (43)
Appendix E: Pareto productivity distribution
Equilibrium Conditions
Assume Pareto productivity, which translates to a cost distribution with the c.d.f given
by G (c) =

c
cM

for c 2 [0; cM ] and   1. The equilibrium is the vector (p^H ; p^L;M)
that solves (42), (40) and (41). With some algebraic manipulations, these conditions are
translated to
0 = 

r;; H ;
sH
sL

(44)
p^L = c

+1
M

N
f
 2 (r;; H)
  1
+1
(45)
M =
NsL
f
 2 (r;; H)
 1 (r;; H)
; (46)
where


r;; H ;
sH
sL

 r
+1
2+ 1

1  1=2H
2+1
h
(Hr + L)
1=2   1=2H r1=2
i2   sHsL

1  1=2H

+
2
h
r1=2 +

sH
sL
  1

(Hr + L)
1=2
i h
(Hr + L)
1=2   1=2H r1=2
i
2+ 1
;
 1 (r;; H) 
 
(Hr + L)
1=2   1=2H r1=2
1  1=2H
!2
  2 (Hr + L)
1=2
2+ 1
 
(Hr + L)
1=2   1=2H r1=2
1  1=2H
!2+1
;
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and
 2 (r;; H) =
Hr
+1
(+ 1) (2+ 1)
+ L
 
(Hr + L)
1=2   1=2H r1=2
1  1=2H
!2
+
4
h
Hr
1=2   (Hr + L)1=2
i
2+ 1
 
(Hr + L)
1=2   1=2H r1=2
1  1=2H
!2+1
+
L
+ 1
 
(Hr + L)
1=2   1=2H r1=2
1  1=2H
!2+2
.
Points 1 and 2 in Proposition 5
For Points 1 and 2, it suffices to show that (A0) and (A1) hold under Pareto productivity,
as Lemma 1 and Propositions 3 and 4 can be therefore applied. Under G (c) = (c=cM)
,
where c 2 [0; cM ] and  > 1, it is immediate that E(c) = cM
R cM
0
cdc = cM
+1
< 1, and
hence (A0) holds. The next task is to show that @eH=@p^H > 0 and @eH=@p^L < 0. Observe
that we can rewrite eH (p^H ; p^L) as
eH (p^H ; p^L) =

cM
Z c^
0

p^H   (H p^H + Lp^L)1=2 c1=2

c 1dc+
Z p^H
c^

p^H   p^1=2H c1=2

c 1dc

/ p^H
Z p^H
0
c 1dc 

(H p^H + Lp^L)
1=2
Z c^
0
c 1=2dc+ p^1=2H
Z p^H
c^
c 1=2dc

=
1=2
 (+ 1=2)
p^+1H  
1
+ 1=2

p^
1=2
HL   p^1=2H
 h
(p^HL)
1=2   (H p^H)1=2
i2+1

1  1=2H
2+1 :
Thus,
@eH=@p^L
/  Lp^
 1=2
HL
2
h
(p^HL)
1=2   1=2H p^1=2H
i2+1
+ (2+ 1)

p^
1=2
HL   p^1=2H
 h
(p^HL)
1=2   1=2H p^1=2H
i2
< 0:
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And,
@eH=@p^H
/ 1=2 (+ 1)
 (+ 1=2)
p^H
 

H
2
p^
 1=2
HL   12 p^ 1=2H


h
p^
1=2
HL   (H p^H)1=2
i
+ H(2+1)
2

p^
1=2
HL   p^1=2H

p^
 1=2
HL   (H p^H) 1=2

(+ 1=2)

1  1=2H
2+1 h
(p^HL)
1=2   (H p^H)1=2
i 2 .
The above is positive if the second term is positive, that is, if
H
2
p^
 1=2
HL  
1
2
p^
 1=2
H


h
p^
1=2
HL   (H p^H)1=2
i
+
H (2+ 1)
2

p^
1=2
HL   p^1=2H

p^
 1=2
HL   (H p^H) 1=2

< 0:
The above is true iff
(2+ 2)

H + 
1=2
H

<
h
1 + (2+ 1)
1=2
H
iH p^H + Lp^L
p^H
1=2
+
h

3=2
H + H (2+ 1)
iH p^H + Lp^L
p^H
 1=2
:
Let y 

H p^H+Lp^L
p^H
1=2
=

H + L
p^L
p^H
1=2
2 (0; 1). Thus, the above is true iff
h
1 + (2+ 1)
1=2
H
i
y2   (2+ 2)

H + 
1=2
H

y +
h

3=2
H + H (2+ 1)
i
> 0: (47)
As the determinant
  (2+ 2)

H + 
1=2
H
2
  4
h
1 + (2+ 1)
1=2
H
i h

3=2
H + H (2+ 1)
i
=  2H
 
2 + 6+ 82
p
H + (1 + 3)H + 3+ 1

< 0;
and
h
1 + (2+ 1)
1=2
H
i
> 0, (47) is true.
Comparative Statics of Income Distribution
The effect of sH=sL on r
Observe that
@ (r;; H ; x)
@x
=  

1  1=2H

+
2 (Hr + L)
1=2
2+ 1
h
(Hr + L)
1=2   1=2H r1=2
i
:
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The above is negative iff the following is negative:
(Hr + L)  (Hr + L)1=2 1=2H r1=2 <
(2+ 1)
2

1  1=2H

: (48)
Note that
d
dr
h
(Hr + L)  (Hr + L)1=2 1=2H r1=2
i
=  2r
3
2
H +
p
H (1  H)  2
p
rH
p
(1  H) + rH
2
p
(1  H) r + r2H
;
which is negative if and only if 1   H > 0, which is true. Hence, the upper bound of
(Hr + L)   (Hr + L)1=2 1=2H r1=2 is its value at r = 1, 1   1=2H . Hence, (48) is true, and
equilibrium r strictly increases in sH
sL
.
 2 and  2= 1 are both strictly increasing in r
Next, we show that  02 (r) > 0. Suppose  02 (r)  0, and consider an increase in sH
with sL fixed. Then, r increases. By  02 (r)  0, equilibrium p^L increases or stays the
same, which in turn implies that equilibrium p^H increases. Thus, dp^HdsH > 0. By the lemmas
proved in Appendix D, dp^L
dsL
> 0, dp^H
dsL
< 0, and dp^L
dsH
< 0. But dp^L
dsH
< 0 implies that p^L
decreases, which is a contradiction. The result follows.
Next, we show that ( 2= 1)
0 (r) > 0. Suppose ( 2= 1)
0 (r)  0, and again consider an
increase in sH with sL fixed. Then, r increases. By  02 (r) > 0, equilibrium p^L decreases.
Again, by the lemmas in Appendix D, p^H increases. As eLL > 0 and eLH < 0, eL decreases.
As ( 2= 1)
0 (r)  0, equilibrium M decreases or stays the same. Equilibrium condition
sL= (M) = eL is thus violated.
Appendix F: Production in International Trade
Firms differ in their marginal cost wic. Given equilibrium p^L and p^H , the problem for a
firm located in i with c is
max
fpijgnj=1c
i (c) =
X
j
[pij   ijwic]Qij (pij; c) :
This is equivalent to solving, in each market j,
max
pijc
ij (c) =
8<: [pij   ijwic]HNj

p^H;j
pij
  1

if pij 2 [p^L;j; p^H;j)
[pij   ijwic]Nj

H p^H;j+Lp^L;j
pij
  1

if pij 2 [0; p^L;j)
:
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For pij 2 [0; p^L;j),
HL;ij (c) = max
pij
[pij   ijwic]Nj

H p^H;j + Lp^L;j
pij
  1

;
which entails
pij;HL (c) = 
1=2
ij w
1=2
i c
1=2 (H p^H;j + Lp^L;j)
1=2
mij;HL (c)  pijHL (c)
ijwic
=

H p^H;j + Lp^L;j
ijwic
1=2
ij;HL (c) = Nj
h
(H p^H;j + Lp^L;j)
1=2   (ijwic)1=2
i2
:
For pij 2 [p^L;j; p^H;j), the firms’ problem is
max
pij
H;ij (c) = [pij   ijwic]HNj

p^H;j
pij
  1

;
and the first-order condition entails
pH;ij (c) = (ijwic)
1=2 p^
1=2
H;j
mH;ij (c)  pH;ij (c)
ijwic
=

p^H;j
ijwic
1=2
H;ij (c) = HNj
h
p^
1=2
H;j   (ijwic)1=2
i2
:
The difference here from the closed economy model is that the existence of ij raises
prices but decreases markups, given p^H;j and p^L;j .
Next, HL;ij (c)  H;ij (c) > 0 if and only if
c1=2 < c^
1=2
ij 
(H p^H;j + Lp^L;j)
1=2   1=2H p^1=2H;j
(ijwi)
1=2

1  1=2H
 : (49)
To summarize, the optimal price is
pij (c) =
(
pHL;ij (c) = 
1=2
ij w
1=2
i c
1=2 (H p^H;j + Lp^L;j)
1=2 if c  c^ij
pH;ij (c) = (ijwic)
1=2 p^
1=2
H;j if c > c^ij
:
Note that pH;ij (c) > pHL;ij (c) for any c. So there is upward jump of the price schedule p
in terms of c at c^ij .
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Appendix G: Welfare in International Trade
Indirect utility is given by (35) or
U (sh) =
Z
!2
h
ln

p^h
p (!)

d!:
The low income worker has a set of consumed goods 
L that includes the ranges [0;M ]
[0; c^] and [0;M ]  [0; c^= ] for local and imported goods. Using equilibrium prices p,
p^L=p
 (!) = p^L=(p^HLc)1=2 and p^L=(p^HLc)1=2 for local and imported consumption, we have
U (sL) =
Z c^
0
ln

p^L
(p^HLc)1=2

MdG(c) + (n  1)
Z c^=
0
ln

p^L
(p^HLc)1=2

MdG(c).
One can compute
R
ln
 
Ac 1=2

dG(c) = 1
2

c
cM
 
2 ln (A) + 1

  ln (c) where A is a posi-
tive constant. Applying this to the above expression and simplifying, we have
U (sL) = M

1 + (n  1)  p^L
cM

a
2
  a ln
h
1  1=2H

a+ (Har)
1=2
i
,
where r = p^H=p^L and a = c^=p^L.
The high income worker has a set of consumed goods 
H that includes the ranges
[0;M ]  [0; p^H ] and [0;M ]  [0; p^H= ] for local and imported goods. Using equilibrium
prices,we have
U (sH) =
Z c^
0
ln

p^H
(p^HLc)1=2

MdG(c) +
Z bpH
c^
ln

p^H
(p^Hc)1=2

MdG(c)
+ (n  1)
"Z c^=
0
ln

p^H
(p^HLc)1=2

MdG(c) +
Z p^H=
c^
ln

p^H
(p^Hc)1=2

MdG(c)
#
.
Using the same procedure as above, this simplifies to
U (sH) = M

1 + (n  1)  p^L
cM

a ln

r1=2 (Hr + L)
 1=2

+
r
2

:
Appendix H: Equivalent Variation
We define the relative equivalent variation to be the relative increase in income, (sh=sh)
eq,
that a worker h must receive to raise her utility level from the equilibrium utility Uh to
the target utility level Uh taking as given the equilibrium price system p (!), ! 2 
 and
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its product space 
. By (35), we can write worker h’s indirect utility as
Vh(sh) =
Z
!2
h
ln
bph(sh)
p (!)

d!
where bph(sh) = (sh + P h ) = j
hj is the workers h’s choke price expressed as a function of
income sh, 
h is her equilibrium set of purchased goods and P

h =
R
!2
h
p (!) d! her
price index. Then, a relative increase in income sh=sh implies an income change from sh
to sh + sh, which yields a change in utility level such that
Uh   Uh =
Z
!2
h
ln
 bph(sh)bph(sh + sh)

d! = j
hj ln

sh + P

h
sh + sh + P h

.
Inverting this expression, we obtain
sh
sh + P h
= exp

 U

h   Uh
j
hj

  1.
Using the definition of bph(sh), the relative equivalent variation can be expressed as
sh
sh
eq
=
j
hj bph(sh)
sh

exp

Uh   Uh
j
hj

  1

. (50)
The low income consumers have bpL(sL) = bpL. Under Pareto productivity distributions,
the mass of varieties is given by j
Lj = MG(bc) [1 + (n  1) ]. Then, their relative equiv-
alent variation is given by
sL
sL
eq
=
MG(bc)bpL
sL

1 + (n  1)  exp UL   UL
MG(bc) [1 + (n  1) ]

  1

.
The high income consumers with bpH(sH) = bpH and j
H j = MG(bpH) [1 + (n  1) ] have
sH
sH
eq
=
MG(bpH)bpH
sH

1 + (n  1)  exp UH   UH
MG(bpH) [1 + (n  1) ]

  1

.
Note that for small utility differences, we can approximate relative equivalent variations
as 
sh
sh
eq
' bph
sh
(Uh   Uh) , h = L;H .
Equivalent variations are proportional to utility differential and the income group’s choke
price. Since bpH > bpL, a same rise in utility requires a larger increase in income for the
higher income consumer because their marginal utility of consumption is lower. Finally,
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note that equivalent variations are partial equilibrium concepts because prices are fixed
although they vary in our general equilibrium framework.
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Dependent variable
Measure of income 
inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Income Inequality -0.692 -2.366*** -1.460*** -2.401*** -0.685* -0.722* -1.034* -2.438*** -1.281** -2.476*** -0.780* -0.807*
(0.432) (0.611) (0.495) (0.623) (0.377) (0.368) (0.586) (0.656) (0.527) (0.670) (0.419) (0.409)
Rule of Law 0.085 0.056 0.104*** 0.079** 0.081 0.051 0.103*** 0.077**
(0.059) (0.082) (0.039) (0.039) (0.060) (0.084) (0.038) (0.038)
Market Access 0.109*** 0.126*** 0.107*** 0.125***
(0.038) (0.034) (0.038) (0.034)
Constant -0.431** 0.253 -0.227 0.265 -2.187*** -2.451*** -0.381* 0.069 -0.415** 0.08 -2.183*** -2.474***
(0.187) (0.249) (0.198) (0.253) (0.512) (0.455) (0.195) (0.210) (0.165) (0.214) (0.508) (0.459)
Observations 1297 1297 1297 1297 538 538 1297 1297 1297 1297 538 538
R-squared 0.018 0.126 0.399 0.129 0.239 0.126 0.026 0.093 0.379 0.095 0.237 0.122
Year FE No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1: Income Inequality and TFP
Standard errors are clustered at the country level and shown in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
ln(TFP)
Gini Coefficient Top 10% Income Share
